Introduction: The controversial issue of the functional immunity of State officials from foreign jurisdiction and the work of the ILC
The norms of customary international law concerning the functional (or ratione materiae) immunity of State officials from foreign (criminal, civil and administrative) jurisdiction are somewhat dated but nonetheless remain controversial and contemporary international law scholars still disagree about their scope of application and content. This is due to different conceptual premises of international scholars, as well as a lack of uniformity and consistency in practice and case-law.
The United Nations' International Law Commission (ILC) has recently undertaken a study on a key aspect of this topic, namely the functional (as well as personal) immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. 1 However, in the view of this author, these works have not yet clarified the most controversial legal issues and further have not yet produced convincing results. In fact, both the ILC Special Rapporteurs have dogmatically accepted, without any form of critical review, the old 'Kelsenian theory', according to which all State officials have the right, in principle, to functional immunity from foreign jurisdiction regarding their 'official' acts, i.e., when acting in their official capacity.
This basic theory, which will have a strong impact on the future work of the ILC, is not convincing. Thus, the issue is worth reexamining, especially in light of the most recent developments in practice and in the literature. In doing so, this paper will deal with the entire issue of the functional immunity of foreign officials, without limiting the research to immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
Problems relating to the distinction between personal and functional immunities
According to the dominant view of international scholars, a clear and radical distinction should be made between the concept of both the State officials' personal and functional immunities (and between the corresponding international norms). As we shall see below, nowadays this position demands a critical review. Effectively, some differences are clear and well-settled. The main one concerns the duration of immunity. While personal immunity is only granted to foreign officials for the duration of their mandate (covering acts performed before and during the mandate) and ceases to apply after the termination of their mandate, functional immunity is granted both during their mandate and after its termination (but the immunity only covers acts performed in the context of the mandate).
A second difference, according to the prevailing, but not unanimous view in the literature, concerns the scope of the application of immunity. While personal immunity covers both the 'private' and 'official' acts of foreign officials who benefit from it, immunity only covers the acts performed by State agents in the discharge of their duties (so-called 'official acts'). However, the interpretation of the concept of 'official acts' is itself the subject of differing opinions.
Other distinctions between personal and functional immunities are more controversial. In particular, there is no agreement on one important conceptual premise which gives rise to many legal consequences, namely whether or not the legal foundation of these two forms of immunity is radically different.
In fact, personal immunity is unanimously seen as being based on the concept that an official's acts are attributed to the individual agent and that such immunity has the procedural nature of an exemption from legal proceedings (but not from the law). Moreover, there is general consensus on the fact that personal immunity is only available to a limited number of State officials (diplomatic agents, heads of State and government, ministers of foreign affairs, members of special missions), all of whom perform duties pertaining to their State's international relations.
On the contrary, scholars are divided on the question of the legal foundation of functional immunity. In brief, we can start by saying that, according to the traditional long held view, functional immunity is based on the conceptual premise that acts performed by an agent in his/her official capacity and in the exercise of his/her duties cannot be attributed to the individual agent, but only and always to the State for which the official is acting. Therefore, functional immunity should not be procedural in nature, but rather should represent a substantive exemption from the law. This would mean that functional immunity is due to all foreign State officials and, at least in principle, would cover all their 'official' acts. However, a growing number of scholars reject the basic conceptual premise of this traditional view and maintain that functional immunity has the same procedural nature as personal immunity. The latter approach induces many writers to deny the fact dalla giurisdizione ' (1940) that functional immunity is available to all foreign State agents and/or the fact that such immunity covers all the official acts of those agents.
Thus, the different doctrinal views on the legal basis of functional immunity have an impact on any conclusions regarding the scope of its application and its content, as well as any conclusions on the real extent and significance of the distinction between personal and functional immunities. It is therefore appropriate to carry out a brief review of these doctrinal views, in order to subsequently verify their validity through an empirical examination of international practice.
Doctrinal theories regarding functional immunity
As the doctrinal theories on the legal basis and the scope of application of functional immunity are numerous, it is worth organizing them into three main general approaches.
According to the first and oldest approach, the legal regime of functional immunity has a general scope of application; that is, it applies to all State officials and to all acts performed by them in the exercise of their duties. Within this approach, many individual theories are based on a deductive method, founded on the conceptual premise that every 'official' act of a foreign State's agent can be attributed only to the State for which the agent is acting. For some scholars, this deduction derives from the principle of international law that is intended to protect the internal organization of the State.
3 For others it derives from the principle of non-interference in the constitutional 'life' of the foreign 3 State, 4 or from the principle that protects the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of the State in its relationship with its own agents.
5 For yet others, it derives from the concept that the functional immunity of foreign officials ultimately coincides with the immunity of foreign States.
6 A further theory, based instead on an inductive method, maintains that a specific customary norm has developed, which prohibits the exercise of State jurisdiction over foreign State agents acting in their 'official' capacity 7 . The latter theory has, in substance, been espoused by the two ILC Special Rapporteurs in their work on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. (Giuf- maintains that functional immunity covers foreign officials when they cannot be held personally responsible for their acts because they are conducted under the authority of their State, that is to say, they are 'the arm and mouthpiece' used by the State in its actions. Consequently foreign officials have no right to functional immunity when performing acts that can also be attributed to themselves and for which they may be personally responsible.
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A third recent theory maintains that the relationship between the individual agent and the State, which constitutes the legal basis for functional immunity, is governed by specific norms of international law, according to which this immunity is due to foreign officials only when their acts are 'performed in the service of the foreign State'; this wording excludes acts that are not based on the exercise of public duties or acts that are prohibited by international law provisions addressed to individuals.
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Lastly, according to the third, and less traditional, doctrinal approach, which represents a radical break from the others, the legal regime of foreign officials' functional immunity is not governed by a single and sole customary norm, as international practice demonstrates that such a regime is both fragmented and complex. In other words, no principle or customary norm on functional immunity may be applicable in the same way to all foreign officials for all their acts or for entire categories of certain acts. On the contrary, there is a range of different norms, which change according to different officials, different acts, or the exercise of criminal or civil jurisdiction. Various doctrinal theories have also developed within this third approach. A first theory maintains that different norms concerning the functional immunity of foreign officials apply according to the kind of activities performed; i.e., whether they are 'official' acts prohibited by international law, acts only lawful in international law, or acts specifically protected by international law. 12 According to a second theory, a distinction must be made between the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and that of civil jurisdiction: foreign officials have no right to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, at least in general international law, and only some categories of foreign officials have a right to immunity from civil jurisdiction, but on the basis of international norms having different contents. 13 According to a third theory, which is also based on a distinction between criminal and civil jurisdiction, only some categories of foreign officials have a right to immunity from both civil and criminal jurisdiction, while all other foreign officials only have the right to immunity from civil jurisdiction. 14 Lastly, according to a fourth and even more radical theory, only a restricted core of foreign officials, by virtue of their duties specifically pertaining to international relations, have the right to functional immunity from both criminal and civil jurisdiction, while all other foreign officials have no right to such immunity. each theory in the light of international practice, it is worth providing some observations of a general and methodological character.
First of all, in the light of contemporary international law the validity of the oldest theories, based on a merely deductive method, should be questioned, as they construct a legal regime of functional immunity applicable to all foreign officials based on general, aprioristic and unproven principles, such as the principle of protection of the State's domestic organization, that of non-interference in the constitutional 'life' of the State, that of protection of the State's 'exclusive jurisdiction' in its relationship with its own agents, or that of concurrence between the immunity of officials and the immunity of the State. This deductive method is now considered by international scholars to be obsolete.
Secondly, it is wise to question the traditional theory on the foundations of functional immunity, which is based on the conceptual premise that 'official' acts performed by an agent of the foreign State are always and only attributable to the foreign State, and never to the individual agent, who cannot therefore be held responsible for those acts. This fundamental idea, of the necessary irresponsibility of individual State agents when acting in an 'official' capacity, is at the basis of many of the above-mentioned traditional theories. However, in this author's opinion, this idea, which belongs to the historical period in which international law only recognized the collective responsibility of the State, has lost all validity in contemporary international law, which admits the personal responsibility of individuals, and especially of individual State agents, alongside the collective responsibility of the State. Following this trend, the rapid development of international criminal law has led to a radical break away from the traditional system of international responsibility, also impacting upon the whole system of international law. Therefore, the old dogma regarding the absoluteness of the organic link between the individual State agent and his/her State, which has been outmoded in domestic law for some time, is now also obsolete in international law.
Thirdly, and consequently, there is now some doubt as to the concept that the functional immunity of foreign officials should be conceived as a form of irresponsibility, i.e., as an exemption from the law, and that, therefore, it should be applicable to all State officials when performing their duties. On the contrary, it is conceivable that only some State officials have a right to functional immunity, by virtue of the importance of their duties for their State's international relations 16 . Besides, from a logical viewpoint, it is hardly justifiable in contemporary international law for functional immunity to expand to such an extent as to include all persons belonging to the entire public administration of a foreign State. 17 Fourthly, considering the rapid development of the whole system of international law over the last few decades, it is clearly possible that international norms regarding the immunity of foreign officials have also undergone a process of evolution, and that a progressive reduction has occurred in the scope of application of functional immunity. It is also plausible that a progressive 'rapprochement' is taking place between the legal regime of functional immunity and that of personal immunity.
That said, it is almost inevitable therefore to conclude that the doctrinal theories based on a deductive method are now inadequate and that the problem of the legal regime of foreign officials' functional immunity should be dealt with using an inductive method, founded on an examination of practice and opinio iuris. Moreover, this examination should be conducted using an appropriate methodology. This means, first of all, not starting from the aprioristic and unproven assumption that a survey of international practice will only prove the existence or non-existence of a single customary norm on functional immunity, possibly applicable to all foreign officials without distinction. On the contrary, such an examination needs to cover practice relating to all categories of State officials who may, at least hypothetically, have the right to immunity. Secondly, since all jurisdictional immunities of foreign officials establish an exception to the usual exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial State, any demonstration of the existence of customary norms relating to immunities must be rigorous; i.e. based on extensive, consolidated and uniform practice and a welldemonstrated opinio iuris. In the absence of these elements, the conclusion that such customary norms do not exist is inevitable. A first category of State officials who undoubtedly have a right to functional immunity is that of diplomatic agents. This emerges clearly from international practice, although such practice is not particularly extensive, since the functional immunity for the most part needs to be inferred from practice relating to former diplomatic agents with regard to official acts performed during their mandates. 19 It is not helpful to look at practice relating to diplomatic agents during their mandates, as they enjoy personal immunity for that period of time, which covers both official and private acts 20 and therefore ends up absorbing functional immunity. Although not extensive, international practice is nonetheless composed of a uniform and unambiguous series of domestic court judgments. 21 Moreover, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, commonly considered as a codification of customary international law, contains certain provisions that confirm diplomatic agents' enjoyment of not only personal, but also functional immunity.
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A second category of State officials who have a right to functional immunity according to prevailing opinion is that of heads of State, approach, which reverses the correct method, the immunity of foreign officials would be the rule and the practice would serve to prove the lack of immunity. 19 The functional immunity of diplomatic agents could also be inferred from practice concerning diplomatic agents having the same nationality of the host State and from practice regarding the granting of immunity from States different to the host State. But such practice is almost non-existent. 20 According to the dominant view in literature. See n 2. 21 heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs. These figures enjoy personal immunity during their mandates and their functional immunity therefore has to be inferred, especially from practice concerning former heads of State, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs with regard to official acts performed during their mandates. Although this practice is not completely uniform, it confirms the existence of a customary norm giving these three high-ranking State representatives functional immunity from foreign (criminal and civil) jurisdiction, though, a restrictive interpretation should be given to this immunity. The customary norm can be inferred, above all, from extensive domestic court case-law, 23 one may mention, as a significant example, the clear statements of some law Lords in House of Lords judgment of 24 March 1999 in the Pinochet case. 24 The existence of such a norm is also confirmed, albeit implicitly, in the case York Convention on Special Missions, 30 which, with the intention of assimilating these missions into permanent diplomatic missions, grants members of special missions jurisdictional immunities similar to those of diplomatic agents. In this author's opinion this Convention codifies customary international law, as States' recent practice (although mostly dealing with personal immunity) shows a clear trend in favour of the existence of a customary norm granting members of special missions both personal and functional immunity. 31 In other words, international practice confirms that special missions are to be treated in the same way as permanent diplomatic missions. However, in actual fact, the functional immunity of members of special missions only applies after the cessation of their mission.
A separate legal regime governs the immunity of members of missions representing States in their relations with international organizations or in international conferences. The numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with this matter usually grant such missions only functional immunity. 32 However, it does not appear possible to infer a customary norm on immunity from this set of treaties. Moreover, international practice is not sufficiently extensive and uniform, except for the cases in which immunity has been granted on the basis of a specific treaty provision. military forces operating abroad in times of peace, with the consent of the territorial State, as well as members of military forces operating abroad during wartime occupation or during missions authorised by the United Nations or the European Union.
Military forces
International law scholars are divided about the existence of a customary norm attributing functional immunity to members of military forces. Some writers maintain that such a norm exists and that it grants immunity for acts strictly connected to the duties of the military forces 33 . Others maintain that the customary norm has a more limited scope, since it is supposed to cover only criminal and disciplinary immunity for acts 'exclusively internal' to the military force. 34 Still others deny the existence of a customary norm and maintain that the immunity of military forces is only governed at treaty level. 35 The latter view is the most convincing, as international practice shows that the treatment of members of military forces operating abroad is almost always governed by specific bilateral agreements between the sending State and the territorial State or, in more recent times, by multilateral agreements, such as the SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements). In fact, these agreements have left no room for the development of a customary norm, because they contain very different provisions in regards to jurisdiction over the members of military forces. In some cases the agreement provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State, in others for the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial State, and in yet others for the concurrent jurisdiction of the sending and the territorial State. Hence, in this author's view, it should be concluded that these agreements tend to govern the distribution of competences among States, rather than the functional immunity of military forces. At most it could be inferred from this set of agreements that there is a trend in favour of the of the sending State having priority in terms of the exercise of jurisdiction over military forces.
The idea that there is no customary norm concerning the functional immunity of military forces was recently supported by the High Court 33 See, eg, Conforti (n 14) 6. 34 See, eg, G P Barton, 'Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction ' (1950) of Kerala in its judgment concerning the dispute between Italy and India in the case of the ship Enrica Lexie. 36 The Court rejected the Italian argument that the two Italian marines involved benefitted from functional immunity, stating that, in international law, the immunity of foreign military forces depends on the presence or absence of a specific agreement between the sending and the territorial State.
Other State officials
As we have seen, the practice concerning the various categories of State officials who could, at least hypothetically, enjoy functional immunity demonstrates that only some officials have a right to this immunity on the basis of customary international law.
Therefore, both the doctrinal approach according to which functional immunity is due to all foreign officials in relation to all their acts, and the approach according to which functional immunity is due to all foreign officials but only for their lawful acts or for certain categories of acts should be rejected. Instead, the third doctrinal approach, which denies the existence of a single and sole customary norm applicable to all foreign officials without distinction, seems a more reasonable one. However, in order to be certain, it is also necessary to examine the practice concerning State officials other than those already taken into consideration. In doing so, a distinction should be made between the practice relating to possible immunity from criminal jurisdiction and that relating to possible immunity from civil jurisdiction.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction
An examination of practice, especially more recent practice, demonstrates that there is no norm of customary international law which grants functional immunity from criminal jurisdiction to foreign officials other than those in the four categories mentioned above (diplomatic agents; heads of State and government and ministers of foreign affairs; consular agents; and members of special missions).
Historical practice shows that domestic courts have denied functional immunity to foreign officials when they are accused of: a) espionage; b) serious breaches of the law of war; c) aerial intrusions or unlawful trespassing in foreign territories or maritime spaces. This has also been confirmed in more recent practice. 47 Lastly, the above-mentioned judgment of the High Court of Kerala in the Enrica Lexie case denied the existence of a customary norm providing all foreign officials with immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
Moreover, domestic courts have taken a clear and well-reasoned position against the existence of such a customary norm in two recent and important cases. In the Khurts Bat case, 48 the English High Court was asked to decide whether the head of the executive office of Mongolia's National Security Council -wanted for the crime of abduction among others committed in various European States -could claim functional immunity, being a foreign official who had acted in the exercise of his duties. In its judgment of 2001 the Court denied such immunity, having conducted an in-depth examination of international practice and deduced the non-existence of a customary international norm attributing functional immunity to foreign officials for crimes committed in the territory of a host State or in a third State. In the Abu 54 in which France and Djibouti maintained opposing views in respect of the existence of a customary norm on the functional immunity of all foreign officials. However, in actual fact, the Court avoided making a pronouncement on the matter.
In conclusion, international practice testifies, in a rather consistent and uniform way, to the non-existence of a customary norm regarding the functional immunity of all State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The few judgments in favour of the existence of such a norm are based on erroneous or unconvincing grounds.
Immunity from civil jurisdiction
Moving now to the practice relating to the functional immunity of State officials from foreign civil jurisdiction, it should be noted, above all, that although it is extensive, it is far from uniform. Three main approaches can be distinguished within the case-law.
A first group of cases includes the judgments in which domestic courts have denied, in a fairly explicit way, the existence of a customary norm giving all foreign officials functional immunity from civil jurisdiction.
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A second group of cases includes many United States court judgments, in which the judges have ruled on tort claims lodged against foreign officials, applying the 1789 Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and, on some occasions, the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). In these judgments the courts have asserted their jurisdiction over foreign officials and rejected the declinatory exceptions raised by them. 56 In some cases these courts have rejected the 'act of State' defence, while in other cases they have decided that the immunity granted by the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) is not applicable. Thus, they have not explicitly dealt with the problem of the existence or nonexistence of a customary norm on functional immunity. However, it may be presumed that, by asserting their jurisdiction over foreign officials, these courts have implicitly denied the existence of a customary norm of functional immunity for officials -otherwise, such a norm would surely have been applied.
Lastly, a third group of cases includes several judgments, usually originating from common law countries (with the exception of the USA), in which the courts have granted functional immunity from civil jurisdiction to foreign officials. 57 However, it should be pointed out that these courts have usually maintained that the functional immunity of the officials is synonymous with the immunity of the State. In many common law countries this position derives from the existence of domestic laws dealing with the immunity of foreign States from civil jurisdiction 58 Sometimes these laws also expressly establish the immunity of officials acting in the exercise of their duties; in other cases the same conclusion derives from an interpretation of the same laws. Therefore, the above-mentioned judgments, being mostly based on domestic law, are not especially significant for the identification of customary international law.
It should be mentioned here that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently espoused the approach typical of many common law countries. In fact, in the 2014 Jones judgment 59 the ECtHR affirmed the existence of a norm of general international law according to which the acts performed by State officials in the exercise of their duties are attributed, as far as immunity from civil jurisdiction is concerned, to the State for which they act. However, this judgment is open to criticism in respect of both its conceptual grounds and its very limited and partial examination of international practice. 60 In fact, from a conceptual point of view, the judgment again presents -without any critical examination -a theory connected to a now obsolete conception of functional immunity, which does not fit with contemporary international law. From a more empirical viewpoint, the judgment passively accepts the jurisprudential approach that identifies the immunity of an official with that of the State. This persists in some States but has no equivalent in many others.
What conclusion should therefore be drawn from the international practice relating to the functional immunity of State officials from foreign civil jurisdiction? The answer is complex, because a part of the practice seems to be in favour of immunity, while another part 58 60 See R Pisillo Mazzeschi, 'Le immunità degli Stati e degli organi statali precludono l'accesso alla giustizia anche alle vittime di torture: il caso Jones dinanzi alla Corte europea dei diritti umani' (2014) 6 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 215-223; P Pustorino, 'Immunità dello Stato, immunità degli organi e crimine di tortura: la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo nel caso Jones' (2014) 97 Rivista di diritto internazionale 493 ff.
demonstrates the very opposite view. On the whole, considering the lack of extensive, consistent, consolidated and uniform practice, it is difficult to maintain the existence of both the diuturnitas and the opinio iuris necessary for the identification of a customary norm giving all State officials functional immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction.
Conclusion on the legal basis and scope of application of functional immunity
The examination of international practice conducted above confirms the doctrinal approach according to which there are neither principles nor customary norms on functional immunity that are applicable to all foreign officials, but that there are, instead, a variety of different norms, which are applicable according to the roles of different officials and their respective duties.
With regard to the different officials, functional immunity is due to diplomatic agents; to heads of State, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs; to consular agents; and to members of special missions. These are, with the positive exception of consular agents, the same officials who enjoy personal immunity. Besides, other State officials -i.e. the members of military forces operating abroad -do not enjoy true functional immunity, but rather the sending State enjoys priority in the exercise of coercive, disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction on the basis of treaty law. Therefore, the categories of State officials that have a right to functional immunity are relatively limited in number, almost tending to coincide with the categories of officials who have a right to personal immunity.
With regard to the duties of the various officials, international practice shows that functional immunity is recognized broadly in relation to diplomatic agents and members of special missions; in a somewhat more restricted way in relation to the three most high ranking State representatives; and in an much more restrictive way to consular agents.
These two conclusions are important and suggest a radical change of mind about the foundations, goals and nature of functional immunity. First of all, it is highly significant that international practice disavows the numerous doctrinal views according to which functional immunity should be due to any individual who has the qualification of State official and who acts in that role. This completely undermines the conceptual premise on which the theory of functional immunity has long been grounded, that is to say: the idea that the immunity of State officials is a necessary corollary of the fact that they act as organs of the State; the idea that such immunity derives from the fact that the agent's official acts are not attributable to him/her because they are attributable only to the State for which he/she is acting; and, lastly, the idea -and the basis of all the other concepts -that the very structure of international law only admits the collective responsibility of States. However, this latter idea has clearly been rendered obsolete by the development of international criminal law, which has established the 'normality' of the criminal responsibility of the individual agent besides that of the State and has brought about a structural change in the whole legal regime of international responsibility. In this author's view, this also marks the final demise of the above-mentioned conceptual premise behind the traditional theory of functional immunity.
Having rejected these premises, it becomes clear that the radical difference between the traditional theoretical foundations on which functional and personal immunity were respectively grounded no longer exists; consequently, the idea that any individual who acts for the State has a right to immunity for that reason alone must also be deemed obsolete. International practice, on the contrary, suggests another, more modern, ratio as the basis of functional immunity: i.e. that only some State officials, because of the particular nature of their duties, which concern the external life and external activities of the State, have a right to functional immunity. 61 In other words, the modern ratio of the norms on functional immunity of foreign officials is not founded on the aim of protecting the State as such and, consequently, in the protection of all public functions; but, instead, in the protection of a limited number of State functions: those which are typically important for the external activities of every State. Under this perspective it is absolutely logical that functional immunity covers only those State officials who are typically and normally required to perform duties concerning the external life and activities of the State.
It should be pointed out that, for the purposes of functional immunity, these duties need not concern a true representation of the State in its relations with other States, or the management of international relations. The protection of such duties is entrusted to personal immunity, which is more extensive and significant because it covers both official and personal acts and protects only the officials who, during their mandates, fulfil the important function of representing their State at the international level or of managing its international relations. On the contrary, it is logical that functional immunity, which is less extensive and important because it covers only official acts, be destined to protect the same State officials after the cessation of their mandate, as well as other State officials (i.e. consular agents) who do not represent the State at the international level nor manage its international relations, but have more limited duties concerning the State's external activities. Lastly, for those State officials who only occasionally perform public duties in foreign States (military forces), a lesser protection than that given by immunity seems sufficient: the priority and exclusive jurisdiction sometimes exercised by their national States on the basis of treaty law is a sufficient mechanism of protection in such cases.
In short, it is this author's view that in contemporary international law the whole legal regime of personal and functional immunity from jurisdiction has only one goal, of a single and unitary nature -that of protecting certain specific functions of the State in its external relations or activities, through the protection of the officials who, as a rule, perform those functions. This protection is graduated according to the importance of the functions performed by the different officials and according to whether or not the officials are effectively acting out their mandate at the time. If this is true, it prompts the question whether it is still useful or meaningful to make a clear and radical conceptual distinction between personal and functional immunity.
Brief remarks on the relationship between functional immunity and international crimes
As is well known, one of the most topical and controversial problems of contemporary international law is that of the relationship between the international norms on immunity (including those on the functional immunity of foreign officials) and international norms prohibiting gross violations of human rights, grave breaches of humanitarian law, and international crimes.
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This problem is too complex to be dealt with 63 thoroughly here and therefore will be dealt with only in some brief remarks on the international practice which relates to the conflict between the functional immunity of State officials from foreign (criminal and civil) jurisdiction and the pursuit of justice for international crimes. We must start by saying that the conflict only arises when the norms on immunity totally prevent the victim from having access to justice against a foreign official accused of an international crime, because the victim has no alternative means of redress (the so-called rule of 'equivalent protection'). 64 In this case, the norms on immunity contrast not only with the norms on the prohibition of international crimes, but also (in a more direct way) with the victim's right to access to justice and right to reparation. These latter rights are strictly and necessarily linked to the right not to suffer from the acts of an international crime. In fact, it is clear that an effective substantive right cannot be said to exist in the absence of remedies in the event of its breach; in other words, the victims of international crimes are effectively interested in having access to justice in order to obtain reparation and ensure the punishment of the persons responsible.
That said, international practice tends, on the whole, to deny functional immunity to foreign officials suspected or accused of 62 The international norms on immunities also raise the problem of their possible conflict with certain domestic norms or principles, especially with the norms protecting the right of access to justice. On this issue see Pisillo Mazzeschi (n 60)790-792 and, recently, Corte Costituzionale (22 October 2014) n 238, <www.cortecostituzionale.it>. 63 See Pisillo Mazzeschi (n 60) 777 ff, also for a review of the doctrinal theories on the subject. 64 As is well known, the rule of 'equivalent protection' or 'alternative means of redress' has been developed especially by the ECtHR in order to resolve the conflict between the right of access to justice and the immunity of international organizations. See Subsequently, there seemed to be a tendency to deny functional immunity to foreign officials accused of international crimes, brought on by the famous obiter dictum contained in the 2000 ICJ judgment regarding the Arrest Warrant case. This apparently limited the exception to functional immunity in relation to international crimes to acts performed by State agents in the exercise of their duties, but only for private purposes. 74 The obiter dictum of the ICJ had a negative impact on subsequent practice, causing uncertainty among States and domestic courts about the relationship between functional immunity and international crimes.
cannot override the principle of the prohibition of impunity for international crimes 85 ; and the 2012 ICJ judgment in the case Belgium v. Senegal, 86 although not expressly dealing with immunity, affirmed many 'strong' principles on the prohibition of impunity for torture.
Lastly, the recent and very important judgment no. 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court is worth mentioning. 87 Even though the Court was dealing with the problem of State immunity and from the perspective of the conflict between such immunity and constitutional principles, it affirmed that State immunity cannot be applied to acts that are not related to the typical exercise of governmental authority but are expressly qualified as unlawful acts because they breach fundamental rights. This statement implicitly strengthens the view that the functional immunity of foreign officials cannot cover international crimes.
In conclusion, prevailing practice shows that there is an exception to the norms regarding the functional immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction in cases of officials accused of international crimes. In contrast, the practice is more uncertain with regard to the same exception in relation to immunity from civil jurisdiction. In this author's view, this depends particularly on the fact that the courts of some common law countries continue to uphold the 'Kelsenian theory', according to which the immunity of foreign officials from civil jurisdiction coincides with the immunity of the State for which they act. This paper has already outlined why this opinion is now conceptually outdated. Moreover, it contrasts with the principles and values that inspire the contemporary international community, which recognizes norms on the punishment of international crimes as belonging to customary ius cogens. In contrast, the international community does not grant the same value to the customary norms on functional immunity, even though they protect important values for the pacific development of international relations. Therefore, in the case of true and effective 
